As Rep. John Moolenaar, the chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, stated, “The investigation uncovers an issue that is profoundly troubling. Research done with taxpayers’ dollars and conducted at our national laboratories has ended up in the very hands of the Chinese military and their related defense industries.” It’s not a theoretical danger, but a reality that exists in the form of thousands of projects that have brought together scientists who have received DOE funding with China-based entities that pose a national security risk.
A new report issued to congress weighs the very serious and perilous convergence of scientific, strategic, and security factors. Whereas the U.S. currently pursues highly advanced scientific and military breakthroughs in nuclear and quantum research and the field of materials in order to preserve its leadership position in the world of technology and military capabilities, China is rapidly pursuing scientific and military breakthroughs via strategic cooperation initiatives.
Below is a listicle that would deconstruct nine major findings and contexts from the report, including intelligence on the exploitation of U.S.-funded research by China. Each section would discuss an aspect of the issue, be it the scale of collaboration or the loopholes in quantum technology policy.
1. Extent of China-US Research Collaboration
The researchers were able to trace more than 4,300 academic papers from the period of June 2023 to June 2024 involving scientists receiving DOE funds and Chinese scientists. Of the collaborative efforts cited, approximately half included PLA-affiliated scientists along with state-owned Chinese defense companies. This confirms the degree to which U.S. taxpayer-funded research is entwined with other international parties with interests in the military.
“Many of these projects involve work beyond the type of basic science and involve areas of application that are of clear defense relevance. This would include things such as nuclear energy systems, materials science, and quantum computing that would provide clear strategic advantage should significant advances be made.” The size of such collaborations raises serious concerns about the current systems of oversight in use.
2. Direct Links with Chinese Military Companies
The congressional report identified that DOE-funded projects are involved with Chinese state-run laboratories and universities that are directly under the control of the Chinese military. These are even listed on the Pentagon’s Section 1260H lists of Chinese military-related companies operating within the US. They’re said to be a part of the research pipeline, as this is a clear technology transfer.
This nexus extends well beyond the positive one of intellectual exchange: it brings under one roof organizations that have been associated with cyber attacks and human rights violations, underlining the fact that the danger is one of both technological capability and ethics. This is true even in the presence of sophisticated research performance.
3. DOE’s Longstanding Policy Gaps
The report found that “for decades, the Department of Energy has had ineffective procedures in place to prevent exploitation in science and engineering research.” Without consistent procedures to evaluate risks to national security in research funding decisions, research has continued with partners presenting significant risks.
Proposals include the requirement for mandatory information sharing about Chinese research connections between other agencies in the federal government, thus allowing government-wide scanning for troublesome collaborations. A defect of this nature has made the U.S. research infrastructure vulnerable to government-directed technology transfer activities.
4. Legislative Efforts and Pushback
Also introduced was Rep. Moolenaar’s bill that would have prohibited taxpayer dollars from going to joint research ventures with “foreign adversary-controlled” entities. Though it passed in the House, it did not move as a part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act. The pushback came from over 750 faculty members and top university administrators, possibly due to its imposition of too much chill on research and negatively affecting America’s competitiveness.
This case puts in the main light the conflict between security and the free sharing of scientific research in the country. According to analysts, there is possibly a better means of striking a balance in risk management strategies without the implementation of a total ban on performing the research.
5. Quantum Technology as a strategic battleground
But another important area of competition between the U.S. and China beyond its nuclear research is in relation to quantum technologies. Currently, China has a robust position in terms of quantum communications, given that it has a nationwide QKD network that traverses 2,000 kilometers of optical fibers as well as a number of satellites, which have been utilized to encrypt communications between China and other international governments, such as Russia.
It is relying on PQC as its favored technology, sidestepping QKD technology in its national security networks owing to hardware issues. This may create a risk of interoperability between military forces in an alliance because of diverging thinking.
6. The State-Directed Quantum Model of China
In China, the national quantum strategy has its efforts combined through a government-led program that brings together the R&D facilities and national defense companies. The large-scale projects that include the Micius Satellite and the Beijing-Shanghai Quantum Communication Backbone are just but a few examples of such efforts. Although this approach allows for quicker deployment, it also slows down innovation in the private sector and relies mostly on state support. However, linking quantum research with defense procurements will mean the rapid militarization of such innovation, from encryption networks down to computing models.
7. Quantum Communication Vulnerabilities
While China’s qkd network is enormous in size, it contains trusted relay points where the encryption keys are decrypted and then re-encrypted-a process with potential security weaknesses. Others do not rely on end-to-end entanglement and do not have the power of the advertised capabilities. Each has important implications because this impacts the function that such networks can assume in the provision of unbreakable encryption. Not understanding the limitations may lead to strategic mistakes in planning offensive or defensive cyber attacks.
8. ‘Harvest Now, Decrypt Later’ Risks
Adversaries are already collecting their data encrypted with the intention of decrypting it when the quantum computer becomes powerful enough. This “harvest now, decrypt later” model suggests that the encrypted communications of today could be revealed in the future. Since quantum computing could break the current public key cryptography, the United States’ effort to develop PQC is obviously an exercise in anticipation. However, a lack of coordination among countries might potentially create fragmented communication security across allies through different systems of cryptography.
9. Need for Common Allied Approaches
It should be underlined, however, that quantum countermeasures are not yet full and uniform across the allied nations. A few, including the U.K. and the French government, have demonstrated commitments to the use of PQC-only policies. Others, such as South Korea and the country of Japan, are showing interest in the use of PQC and QKD. Meanwhile, NATO’s stand remains ambiguous as well. Unless implemented with common protocols, trustworthy interoperability in combined military operations could be undermined. Therefore, some initial coordination on acceptable security requirements for joint national security information is needed to avoid costly and dangerous communication disruptions.
The congressional findings stated that China’s exploitation of U.S.-funded research is complex, ranging from nuclear to quantum to advanced materials, and it is not only important to protect such projects but also to make sure there is a coordinated effort among all groups involved, especially now when the advances in research are as vital as their protection, at a time when innovation tends to rapidly turn into military gain.
