Will a handful of smouldering oil refineries inflict a war machine into a coma? The war between the Russians and the Ukrainian has produced an avalanche of audacious assertions most of which crumble upon closer examination. The economy of Russia, its armored forces or even the ability to stay on the battlefield is depicted in the headlines as always being on the verge, and the next game-changing weapon is promoted as the solution to winning the war. However, the data speaks otherwise below the noise.
To geopolitically literate readers and defense analysts, there is a necessity of divesting the fact and narrative. This listicle explores nine popular myths about the war, dismantling exaggeration with operational records, industrial figures, and evidence on the battleground to find the truth about the war.
1. Refinery Strikes Crippled, Not Crippled the Fuel Supply of Russia.
Indeed, Ukrainian long-range airstrikes have already destroyed more than half of Russian large oil refineries, and some estimates have reported that up to 20-25 refining capacity is only temporarily out of commission. The attacks have thrown export prohibitions on gasoline and partial bans on diesel fuel to trigger domestic shortages and higher prices. The upstream crude production in Russia has however not been affected, thus, enabling it to export more crude and import the refined products in Belarus and China. This adjustment loses the strategic effect- refineries are tender targets, but with imports not cut off, the provision of fuel persists.
2. The 70 percent Net Income Continue to fall in Rosneft is not production collapse.
The net income decline of about 70 percent in the first half of 2025 reported by Rosneft was caused by the decrease in global oil prices, a stronger ruble, and more costs incurred by security and repairs, rather than a disaster in production. The revenue dropped by 17.8 percent in rubles, though it dropped by merely around 4.7 percent in USD terms. The production of refineries decreased 7.8 per cent., the diesel most severely affected being reduced 9 per cent. and the gasoline production merely 4 per cent. A good portion of the loss of profits can be attributed to impairments and rerouting expenses which occur on a one-off basis and not long term volume loss.
3. FP-1 Drone In Ukraine: a Tactical Asset.
The locally made FP-1 long-range drone now contributes to 59 and 54 percent of deep-strikes and confirmed hits in Ukraine and Russia, respectively. It was constructed in three days at approximately 55,000 units and is a combination of 1,600km range and high EW resistance. Constant testing and continuous improvement are only possible through mass production, 200 units a day. This cheap, mass-produced strategy has helped Ukraine to uphold refinery attacks, strike at strategic targets, without using munitions of foreign origin.
4. The situation of tank shortages in Russia is being falsely claimed.
Accusations that Russia has exhausted its tank stocks is a confusion between the situation of exhausting ancient storage facilities and destruction. As a matter of fact, thousands of T-72 series and T-90 series tanks have been reinstated, revamped and modernized to suit the increased force designs. Since 2022, 4,000 to 6,000 tanks have been taken out of storage, which is the equivalent of the requirements of newly created divisions and brigades. There are salvage operations where there are vehicles that have been abandoned and production capacity though facing sanctions is being increased to produce in the future.
5. Industrial Strain an Is Reality, Not Death.
Layoffs at Uralvagonzavod, the biggest tank manufacturer of Russia, are an indicator of resource constraints – sanctions have strangled imports of optics, alloys and machine tools. Other departments have reduced their workforce by up to 50 percent and output dropped by 1/3. This limits the capacity of Russia to restore reserves of mass attacks. Nonetheless, the program of refurbishment is ongoing, and plans include leaked plans to restore up to 428 new T-90M/M2 every year by 2028 to demonstrate the desire to maintain armored capability despite the existing bottlenecks.
6. Tomahawk Missiles Are Not the Magic Bullet
The US Tomahawk has a range of 1,600 km, is precise, and has a weight of 310 kg, but Ukraine already has similar-range weapons, including the Flamingo cruise missile and FP-1 drones. According to analysts, dozens of Tomahawks would have shown little strategic impact unless they were used in massed salvos and multiple firing platforms. the value they actually have to Kyiv is in giving indication of greater commitment on the part of the US, rather than special battlefield abilities.
7. The War Economy in Russia is Decelerating
Since 2021, military expenditures have increased by almost 300 percent and 3.8 million people work in the defense sectors. However, it is estimated that growth will be at 1 percent in 2025 compared to 5.6 percent and industries are experiencing labour crunch and increased inflation. To finance the budget the Kremlin has started to sell gold reserves meaning that the fiscal strain is being placed. As long as production is on, it is becoming challenging to maintain the same production under sanctions and with limited resources.
8. Battleground boasts tend to exaggerate the profits
The Russian leadership has made small-town seizures look as a prelude to swiftly charging towards fortified urban belts. As a matter of fact, such cities as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk have been fortified since 2014, and the existing pace of progress implies that it might take years to control the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russian troops are pushed back in Kupyansk by counterattacks of Ukrainian troops, which do not comply with the official information about total control.
9. The two-way Contest of Energy Strikes
As Ukraine strikes Russian oil facilities, Russia keeps on its winter war against the Ukrainian power grid that blackouts the country up to 10 hours per day. Naftogaz estimates that the cost of repairs and importation will be over $3 billion, out of which, the cost of imports is $600 million. The two parties would want to strain the economy and morale of each other via energy warfare, but ultimately, adaptation, be it by importation or grid repair, allows the total failure to take place.
In wartime, stories usually run faster than reality. The fuel system, armored forces and industry of Russia are under actual strain, but they are evolving. The innovations of Ukraine, whether it is mass-produced FP-1 drones or organized infrastructure attacks, are costly but almost never lead to instant strategic failure. Similarly, the simplicity of the long-term conflict is disregarded by the charm of one, single, game-changing weapon. To the defense analysts the lesson is straightforward: defend against hard data, and look to both sides of the coin to be resilient.
