There have been five unsuccessful tests, billions of rubles spent, and no working model of deployment yet the RS-28 Sarmat, the superweapon that President Vladimir Putin once boasted of as being invincible, instead became the symbol of the military-industrial stupor that had reached a boiling point in the Kremlin. This liquid-fueled long-range ballistic missile was designed to supersede the outdated R-36M2 Voevoda and ensure that Russia was a superpower in the nuclear age. On the contrary, recurring disastrous failures have revealed engineering inefficiencies, industrial decay and strategic weaknesses.
The stakes are enormous. The payload size and range of Sarmat was intended to superior any Western missile defense system, which became the foundation of the deterrence strategy applied by Moscow. But every failure to launch not only postpones its service commissioning, it reduces faith in the nuclear preparedness of Russia during a period of increased geopolitical anxiety. These are ten major revelations which depict the way in which Sarmat dream is unravelling.
1. Plesetsk catastrophic Test Failures
The November 28 launch out of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome was a disaster as the RS-28 lost thrust a few seconds after igniting, showering debris into space and leaving a 200-meter-wide crater. Maxar and Planet Labs satellite images showed an unusual purple plume formed by the burning of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide that is both highly carcinogenic. According to analysts like Pavel Podvig, the destruction was so convincing that there was a massive blast, a failure that sketchy of the Soviet personalities. Fires in the nearest forests were burning, and four fire-trucks were put on the case, showing the seriousness of the case.
2. Poor Success Story Amongst Contemporary ICBMs
Following the launch of the Sarmat program in April 2022, there have been five reported failures, and only one flight test was successful. This produces a 75% failure-rate- never before experienced with current ICBM programs. Every prototype failure incurs an estimated cost of 3550 million USD and total hardware losses of more than 150 million USD. Putin agreed in October 2025 that the missile was not in use, refuting previous assertions of the same by the director of Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov. This kind of back and forth undermines confidence in program management and puts the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent of Russia in question.
3. Risks due to a Reduced Phase of Boost
Analysts believe that the attempt by Russia to cut the phase of boost of Sarmat, a strategy to minimize exposure to the missile defense, might have caused serious engineering issues. Proposals are stepped liquid engines with more than one combustion chamber, with more vibrational loads and the possibility of pogo oscillations; or even experimental pulse detonation engines that exacerbate mechanical stress. All these design decisions, aimed at avoiding being intercepted, might have also increased the likelihood of disaster-inducing mechanical failures.
4. Industrial Base in Crisis
Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant (Krasmash) and Makeyev Design Bureau have elderly equipment and shortage of labor force and the loss of skilled and senior engineers through migration or drafting. Embargoes have compelled the use of Chinese CNC machines and the chemical supply of central Asia that is usually of lower quality than precise. There are shifts in leadership, e.g., Dmitry Bakanov succeeding Yury Borisov in February 2025, which demonstrate the panic to rescue the 11-year program. Russia still has to rely on old Voevoda missiles without working Sarmat units.
5. Loss of Ukrainian Technical Support
In 2014, when Russia lost the ability to cooperate with Yuzhmash of Ukraine, Russia lost the expertise needed to maintain the Voevoda fleet critically. Stopgap solutions by Makeyev have enabled the missiles to stay active, although new Sarmat units are absent, the missiles of the Cold War era are required to continue functioning significantly beyond their projected service lifetime. Such a dependency highlights the fact that geopolitical ruptures have physical effects on strategic weapons preparedness.
6. Delay Strategy Implication
The heavy throw-weight of Sarmat could operate up to ten MIRVs or Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles aimed at the future defense of the U.S. missiles. Further delays compel Russia to equip Avangard to modified RS-18 Stilettos, which have since exceeded their maximum service life. This not only derails the force structure plans but it creates possibility of a capability gap in the land leg of the nuclear triad within Russia.
7. Observable Follies during the Satellite Age
The test failures are almost impossible to hide due to proliferation of commercial imaging satellites. The reputational damage has been enhanced by high-resolution photographs of the burn scars, debris fields, and destruction of silos at Plesetsk taken by Maxar and Planet. There was one instance of airspace cautions of a scheduled launch being suddenly called off, only to have an image a few days later showing a crater and fire still going on.
8. Fiscal burden on Roscosmos and Contractors
Roscosmos accumulates debt and it has turned to selling publicly traded bonds, as many as 50 billion rubles, to keep afloat. Contractors, such as Proton-PM, have problems with outdated equipment and disruption of the supply chain, where they rely on domestic or Chinese substitutes of lower quality. Such financial strains drag down production, stall modernization and add to the technical risks in systems such as Sarmat.
9. Political Rhetoric/Technical Reality
Sarmat has been used by Putin and his peers as a nuclear saber-rattling weapon, and there have been threats that it can hit European capitals within minutes. But failures again and again have dulled the psychological impression. According to Tatiana Stanovaya of The Washington Post, the red lines Moscow has been making are not taken seriously by the West, a theory which indicates meager returns on such rhetoric when the weapon reliability is doubted.
10. There is no substitute that can be generated
Contrary to the Bark SLBM that was scrapped and its place taken by the Bulava, no surrogate ICBM is available to substitute the Sarmat. Terminating the program would compel Russia to prolong the lifespan of both Voevoda and the RS-18 missiles which will put it at risk of being unprepared and lacks war head parity with the United States. This puts the Kremlin in a dilemma: either continue with a problematic program or have a strategic capability capability.
The ill-fated history of the RS-28 Sarmat project shows how the disjunction between the strategic aspirations of Russian society and its industry and engineering reality is growing. Every failure adds to the financial losses, postponed force structure strategies, and deteriorated the credibility of deterrence. As a defense analyst and a military technologist, Sarmat has become an object of study in the way the pressure of politics, sanctions, and over-design can bring even the most visible weapons development programs to a halt.
