“What exactly is the $900 billion that will transform the future of drone warfare and the very future of the whole Chinese drone force facing the threat of being grounded in the matter of nights? The FY2026 NDAA is no conventional national defense authorization act; in fact, it is a transformation in how the United States thinks about military technology strategies ranging from war strategies in the Pacific to safeguarding the stadiums of America. “The FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act has profound effects for each of the three poles of our national security,” said Under Secretary of the Air Force Gwendolynn Grantham. “First, it secures our global leadership in such emerging areas as space and Cyber, while also
As those that follow the realm of national security and technology policy will attest to, this years NDAA contains a busy agenda of how Washington is planning to not only win but also deny future wars that could emerge for the nation in the coming years to come. This legislative document contains not only high-level policies of international diplomacy but also very practical tools of enforcement and removal of enemy technology in strategic space while the nation readies its production efforts. The following ten are some of the most key provisions of the 2026 NDAA.
1. The $900 Billion Promise of Autonomous Warfare
The NDAA FY 2026 authorizes the appropriation of $890.6 billion in total for national defense activities, out of which $855.7 billion is allocated to DoD. This is due to the emergence of a new perspective in the field of unmanned and autonomous technologies, in alignment with “Peace Through Strength,” a Trump Administration policy guidance. “Procurement outlays are driven by current operational requirements and a prioritization of rapid fielding in the near term over long-duration research and development, including for the likes of Collaborative Combat Aircraft and Maritime Unmanned Systems,” it added. The “Counter-Unmanned Systems” section received three billion one hundred and eighty-seven million, showing growth from the previous allocation of $940 million in FY 2025. The appropriation and allocation show that drones and the corresponding defense mechanisms are the new priorities in the realm of modernization in the context of force capabilities.
2. DJI Faces Automatic Ban
Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA provides a critical deadline of December 23, 2025, to DJI by which the company will become part of the Covered List of the FCC if a national security audit fails to take place. But to date, no such audit has been begun by any U.S.-based organization; therefore, the ban will soon become a fact anyway. The authority granted to the FCC will empower the FCC to revoke the certification of those objects which are certified and those which are referred to as “shell company” sales of previously certified DJI objects regardless of whether those objects are already listed in the marketplace. Security researcher Konrad Iturbe has identified at least nine “shell companies” for DJI, but with the banning of the component pieces, there will no longer be any loopholes.
3. The Retroactive Enforcement Power of the
In October of 2025, the FCC voted 3-0 to include their power to retroactively ban technology that incorporates components from firms on the Covered List. “This closes loopholes that allowed incorporated products that contained Adversary Tech to fall through the cracks,” it was reported. These new rules include imports and shell companies to ensure that once a firm like DJI has landed on the Covered List, all the hardware from that firm is automatically illegal. “Big box retailers have already removed millions of illegal electronics,” said FCC Chairman Brendan Carr on why this would be true for drones and their components beyond the DJI deadline.
4. Replicator and DAWG: Scaling Drone Mass
“It’s alive,” said Adm. Samuel Paparo of the current Biden administration programmatically related Replicator effort, now functioning within the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group, or DAWG, and “continuing along, with a new focus on larger, longer-range drones in the Indo-Pacific.” “It’s very much a part of our denial defense in a major way,” Paparo said of this new technology. Along the same lines, what is presently being constructed along Ukraine’s robot versus robot “front lines” is found to also help inform “the development of drones for DAWG, and ‘Drone Dominance’ being developed for Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.”
5. Joint Interagency Task Force 401
Section 912 specifies the establishment of JIATF 401, which is “the DoD coordination authority on counter-small UAS,” under which it is “directly under” the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and it addresses “interservice problems in construing the law” in an effort to open the process to “findings on responses to count UAS” in a “consistent” manner of “training.” An organizational shift, in this case, is certainly not random, since there is a rationality behind it, which is to prevent “resource use in piecemeal responses.” It is, of course, a very crucial move in ensuring a uniformity of operating authorities among those in the services, which is very critical, particularly in light of “growing UAS threats in both the battlefield and national airspace.”
6. The SAFER SKIES Act: Local Authorities & Drones
The broader counter-UAS authority (Title LXXXVI) for specific entities of State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial government bodies could trace and thwart drones endangering said covered bodies. Then comes the disabling and/or destruction of enemy drones during activities such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Strict regulations include government training, approved technology, and reporting back to congress. On one side, enhanced authorities are matched by the following harsh penalties for prohibited operations: up to $100,000 for each violation.
7 Taiwan Joint Drone Program
The reports section 1266 additionally requires that a joint program for the development and production of UAS/Counter-UAS between Taiwan and the US Pentagon should take place by March 1st, 2026. The move is necessary to promote the self-defense capacity of Taiwan within the context of the Taiwan Relations Act with the integration of a new element known as the “capability principle” among the US forces in Taiwan.
8. Extension of Supply Chain Control over Ground Systems
The restrictions on Unmanned Ground Vehicle Systems under Section 1 of the Unmanned Ground Vehicle Systems restrictions by Subtitle I, Sections 899A-C extend the restrictions on the use of aerial systems during FY2025 on Unmanned Ground Vehicle Systems from foreign countries. “No executive agency shall purchase or use these systems, closing another pathway for the adversaries tech.” This is a whole-of-government effort directed towards the security of unmanned systems in whatever domain. Ground-based systems must receive the same review that the other systems receive. This provision takes care of the tech that has the capability to enable the surveillance state.
9. BIOSECURE Act
It Section 851 also codifies the “BIO-SECURE Act,” generally prohibiting government contracts for biotechnology-related equipment and/or services that originate from certain Chinese companies of concern. Equipment or services described within these regulations pertain to genetic sequencer and analytical instruments and specified software; it is, however, pertinent that this is looked upon as effective prohibition rather than prohibition due to rights under waiver and grandfather protections. It would take a few years for all facets of this law fully materialize prior to that time period, during which time the OMB list of restricted entities must be submitted within a year after enactment.
10. SkyFoundry: A Niche for Development in Drone Support
“Recognizing capability shortfalls resulting from the restrictions on the use of Chinese UAS,” Section 914 of this act also charged DoD with developing a small UAS production stream in support of domestically made drones. This concept of SkyFoundry is concerned with public private sector partnerships principally federal support of competitively There is a “Small-UAS Industrial Base Working Group” that has been charged with “identifying investments” that are intended to strengthen “weak supply chains” as they seek to reclaim “the cost advantage of China’s normal” UAS “while assuring” a completely “security and sovereign production authority.”
The drone and technology aspects “of the FY2026 NDAA are integral elements of a unified national strategy to preclude adversarial use of technology absent increased US autonomy and coherent counter-UAS policy domestically and internationally. In the present China, there seems to exist a “tighter perimeter” when dealing with technology that takes into account supply-chain constraints, “shared Indo-Pacific developments,” and “ prohibitions.” This has a number of implications, and there is certainly an opportunity as well as a threat posed to the industry and users in America to “adapt and thrive in a secure and domestically-focused industry or enacted out of the battlespace.”
