What happens when the security guarantor of an entire continent starts questioning the deal? That is the question now before European leaders as President Donald Trump’s second term forces a reckoning over military dependence on the United States. His transactional approach to alliances, readiness to negotiate over Europe’s head, and pressure to buy American arms turn long‑standing assumptions upside down.
Decades of transatlantic linkages within NATO had allowed European capitals to underinvest in collective defense, relying on U.S. capabilities for deterrence, command, and high‑end weaponry. Now, with Washington signaling a possible drawdown and Russia’s war in Ukraine grinding on, the European Union and its partners are scrambling to close critical gaps. The ambition is clear: build a credible European pillar of defense. The execution is proving far more complicated.
From the industrial infighting over flagship projects to the counter-drones race, the path to autonomy is strewn with political, economic, and technological obstacles. These nine challenges are a reminder that the route from vision to capability will challenge the continent’s unity and resolve.
1. Broken defense industrial base
European Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius warns that manufacturing is “totally fragmented”, and the countries are “used to working by themselves”. This fragmentation results in duplication of effort, higher costs, and slow delivery of urgently needed systems. The war in Ukraine exposed that problem when at least 11 different types of howitzers were sent, complicating logistics and maintenance. Unless consolidation and harmonised procurement take place, Europe risks wasting resources and failing to achieve the scale needed for sustained deterrence.
2. Flagship Projects, Like FCAS, foundering
The €100 billion Future Combat Air System, destined to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter from 2040, has become a touchstone of industrial rivalry. Squabbles over control and workshare from Dassault and Airbus have slowed progress, to the point where Airbus Defence’s works council chairman Thomas Pretzl even suggested building the jet without Dassault. Brig. Gen. Phillipe Suhr of the French Air Force thinks the programme will survive, but the very public rift underlines how national industrial interests can put a spanner in the wheel of strategic cooperation.
3. The Counter‑Drone Imperative
Drone incursions over civilian airports and military sites from Belgium to Poland have exposed a vulnerability that is cheap for adversaries to exploit. By 2027, the European Drone Defence Initiative aims at a layered network of sensors, jammers, and interceptors. Drawing lessons from Ukraine, it tries to pool resources and align with NATO-but cost asymmetry, shooting down a €10,000 drone with a missile costing hundreds of thousands, demands innovation in low‑cost intercept solutions.
4. Innovation from the Frontlines
Baltic and Nordic companies are driving agile solutions, such as Latvia’s AI‑guided “Blaze” interceptor drone, designed to destroy hostile UAVs at a fraction of the cost of traditional missiles. Sweden’s Nordic Air Defence is working on lightweight, vehicle‑mounted anti‑drone missiles. The new systems promise scalability for small militaries, but as Origin CEO Agris Kipurs points out: “The scale is the challenge in Europe. Europe has to make its mind up and place bets on the champions.”
5. Political Divides Over the EU’s Defence Control
The bloc’s two largest military powers, France and Germany, are loath to cede authority over defense projects to the Commission. Smaller eastern states who face an acute Russian threat often support a greater role for the Commission. That split makes the effort to centralize planning and procurement complex, leaving the EU as a coordinator without direct control over forces or budgets.
6. The NATO Dependency Dilemma
For decades, the U.S. has provided Europe’s strategic enablers-airlift, refuelling, intelligence-and held NATO’s top command posts. A U.S. drawdown would leave gaps in these areas, challenging Europe’s ability to operate independently. German central bank chief Joachim Nagel said recently there are “large gaps between aspiration and reality” when it comes to Europeans relinquishing sovereignty to achieve more together.
7. Trump’s transactional pressure
Trump combines threats of abandonment with calls for more spending, often linked to the buying of US systems. This carries big risks for a patchwork of bilateral deals at the expense of EU coherence. In the worst scenario, Washington could withdraw assets to the Indo‑Pacific, leaving Europe to provide almost all conventional deterrence against Russia. Both scenarios demand that Europe now develop a far more robust deterrent force and collective capability.
8. Strategic Autonomy and Nuclear Coordination
Analysts further argue that credible autonomy must include the nuclear dimension by leveraging deterrents of France and the UK under coordinated frameworks. Conventional capabilities would need a European command-and-control structure-perhaps detachable from NATO-and resistant to high-intensity conflict, integrated across all the various tools of diplomacy, information, military, and economics to enable Europe to act in case NATO consensus breaks down.
9. Financing and industrial scale‑up
The defense industry of Europe has the technical expertise but lacks unified market and sufficient investment. The European Commission is pushing joint funding tools, yet ESG restrictions and fragmented demand deter private capital. About €300 billion in European savings annually flows to the U.S., leakage that may otherwise finance mass production of munitions, drones, and strategic enablers. Without scale, even the best designs will fail to meet operational needs. Meanwhile, Europe’s leaders face a narrowing window to turn political declarations into deployable capabilities.
Unpredictability out of Washington, Russian aggression, and rapid technological change leave little margin for delay. Overcoming industrial fragmentation, political divisions, and procurement inertia will be what determines whether Europe can build a defense posture strong enough to deter threats without leaning on Washington. The alternative is a future where strategic decisions are made elsewhere and Europe’s security remains contingent upon forces beyond its control.
