The U.S. Navy’s vision for its future carrier air wing is at a crossroads. Central to it are two programs one a manned sixth-generation fighter, the other an unmanned tanker that collectively might transform carrier aviation.
Both are challenged by political, industrial, and technical headwinds that will decide if the Navy can preserve air superiority in the Indo-Pacific’s progressively contested airspace.
1. F/A-XX: A Sixth-Generation Imperative Under Threat
Vice Adm. Daniel Cheever, the Navy’s “Air Boss,” calls the F/A-XX “absolutely necessary for air superiority, which enables [for] sea control.” The aircraft is designed to replace the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler in the 2030s, providing a 25 percent range boost over the F-35C, next-generation stealth, and manned-unmanned teaming ability. Boeing and Northrop Grumman are still in the running after Lockheed Martin was eliminated earlier this year. But the Pentagon’s FY 2026 budget put procurement on ice, citing industrial base stress due to the Air Force’s F-47 NGAD program.
2. Congressional Pushback and Funding Battles
The Senate Appropriations Committee has acted to reinstate $1.4 billion for F/A-XX in accordance with the Navy’s Unfunded Priority List. Adm. Daryl Caudle cautioned that in the absence of a sixth-generation replacement, the Navy will be “forced to retrofit 4th generation aircraft and increase procurement of 5th generation aircraft to try to keep up with the new 6th generation aircraft that the threat is already employing.” The House Armed Services Committee is also pushing back against Pentagon efforts to steer $500 million from F/A-XX to the F-47, calling for better justification.
3. Carrier-Based Sixth-Gen Fighter Demands on Engineering
Carrier operations place special structural and systems demands. Configuration designs have to withstand arrested landings, catapult launches, and saltwater corrosion while minimizing observability. Northrop’s conceptual image suggests a chine-blended fuselage, radar cross-section minimizing top-mounted intakes, and twin-wheel heavy-duty undercarriage. Judging criteria include AI-facilitated networking, thrust-to-weight ratio, and interoperability with unmanned aerial vehicles.
4. Indo-Pacific Range and Survivability Demands
Fighter operations in the Pacific require unrefueled combat radii of more than 1,000 nautical miles to minimize dependence on vulnerable tankers. The F/A-XX will be required to carry large internal fuel capacities and oversized weapons bays for long-range missiles, which are a requirement for countering the PRC’s anti-access/area denial capabilities. As Adm. James Kilby stated, survivability will depend on “signatures, range, and different engines” to counter the PRC threat.
5. MQ-25 Stingray: Enabling Manned-Unmanned Teaming
The MQ-25A, with its ability to deliver 15,000 pounds of fuel at 500 nautical miles, can release 20–30 percent of Super Hornet sorties currently committed to buddy refueling. Cheever describes it as “the key that unlocks manned-unmanned teaming on the aircraft carrier.” Aside from tanking, the Stingray’s baseline ISR suite and loiter time might allow for strike, airborne early warning, and electronic warfare missions.
6. Carrier Integration Challenges for Unmanned Systems
Incorporating the MQ-25 into the carrier environment means new deck control stations, deconfliction policies for airspace, and modifications for unpredictable sea states. Rear Adm. Keith Hash underscored that demonstrating unmanned operations at sea is “the biggest challenge in getting unmanned aviation to the carrier.” Lessons learned will provide the starting point for future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) integration.
7. Collaborative Combat Aircraft and the MQ-28 Ghost Bat
The Navy is working with the Air Force and Marine Corps on CCA development, with a goal of common control architectures. Although the Air Force has rolled out platforms such as the YFQ-42 and YFQ-44, the Navy sees carrier-capable CCAs as potentially “consumable” in high-threat sorties. Interest in the MQ-28 Ghost Bat demonstrates a desire for low-cost, high-autonomy wingmen to complement manned fighters in strike, ISR, and electronic attack missions.
8. Strategic Risks of Delay
F/A-XX delays would compel the Navy to extend Super Hornet production or buy more F-35Cs, neither optimal for Pacific operations. Without the MQ-25 refueling capability, carrier air wings are range-constrained and tanker-dependent a vulnerability China could exploit with its long-range missile capabilities. The Navy’s modernization path depends on synchronized industrial capacity, congressional backing, and technical execution among these interdependent programs.
