In one of the most eventful nights of aerial battles over the past few weeks, Ukraine’s F-16s successfully downed Russian cruise missiles with a level of success that was almost perfect. Thirty-four out of a total of 35 cruise missiles targetting Ukraine were intercepted before reaching their destination on either 22nd or 23rd of last month. Although these are the kinds of events that tell us the most about what is happening between Ukraine and Russia through their headlines, it is a reality of a different nature altogether that actually exists below these headlines.
It was a part of a massive joint attack involving 673 aerial threats, including missiles and drones targeting critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Air Force was successful in suppressing or jamming 621 threats. Although the result was historical, the Military Command of Ukraine has clearly manifested that it would be impossible to achieve the kind of success unless the supply of air-to-air missiles or surface-to-air missiles continues relentlessly. Tonight’s operation reveals the rising role of air defense integration techniques and technology in response to the attack pattern adopted by Russia.
1. Almost Perfect Cruise Missiles Interception by F-16
The key interceptors in the overnight strike were F-16 tactical planes that have destroyed 34 out of the 35 Russian cruise missiles, reported Colonel Yuriy Ihnat, spokesperson of the Ukrainian Air Force. This is the exceptionally high effectiveness of air defense, he added: The Kinzhal rockets that had not reached the target via intercepts by the Surface to Air Missile Patriots did not reach the target either. This was achieved when the Russian missiles were a limited resource that would soon be in short numbers in Ukraine. On the other hand, the Ukrainian airmen had enough air-to-air rockets for a few more days. This exercise reinforced the message about the need for tactical support in adding to the defenses that are launched from the ground. The Mirage, the Mig 29s, as well as the Su-27 aircraft of the Ukraine, also took part in the exercise. The role of the Air Force in arranging the coordination also contributed in a major way to its success.
2. Large Russian Strike Wave and its Targets
The night attack is a part of a massive strike operation involving 635 strike drones and 38 missiles, including three Kh-47M2 Kinzhals and 35 X-101/Iskander-K Cruise missiles. The departure points were initially in Ryazan and Vologda Oblasts and even in Crimea, which is under occupation at this moment. Again, attacking energy infrastructure remained a prime target, leading to injuries in Sviatoshynskyi District in the city of Kyiv and power cuts in Rivne, Ternopil, and Khmelnytskyi Oblasts. These waves of attacks are designed to flood the radar and missile systems. It has been reported that the total number of drones destroyed is 587, and the number of cruise missiles destroyed is 34. Even the number reflects not only the threat posed by the drones but also the power of the Ukrainian defense system.
3. Shortage of Air Defence Missiles
Ihnat indicated that the number of air defense missiles is inadequate both in air defense and ground-launched air defense missiles. These can be fixed or not functional because they lack ammunition. Volodymyr Zelensky, the president, asked partners to provide even more missiles since if not provided, the number of interceptions would be reduced. Moreover, international production capacity also adds to making it difficult for Ukraine to possess these missiles. Every year, Lockheed Martin can produce 500 PAC-3 missiles, and they are targeting an increase in production up to 650 in 2027. According to Kryvolap, an aviation specialist from Ukraine, at least two Patriot missiles are needed to bring down one ballistic missile.
4. Russian Adaptations to Defeat Patriots
Russia has also optimized Iskander missile trajectories to circumvent weaknesses in PAC-3 Patriot missile defense system geometries. The effectiveness of missile interceptions has been influenced. Comparatively speaking, SAMP/T NG missile defense systems of France/Italy fare better. These measures will ensure that Ukraine resorts to diversity in its mode of defense. This will demonstrate that the reliance on missile defense in part depends on technology but could be dictated by geometry and time.
5. Integration of Air and Ground Defenses
It was also partly supported by rapid decisions regarding tactics for using assets. As noted by Ihnat, decisions have to be made in a matter of minutes with respect to placement of surface assets, drone interceptors, and manned aircraft before the paths of the incoming missiles are available. This is the hallmark of an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), whereby there is the integration of sensors with shooters to detect objects at differing altitudes, speeds, and trajectories. It will be even harder in complex topography situations.
6. Electronic Warfare against Kinzhals
Additionally, the Ukrainian special forces use EW systems such as Lima to jam the navigation system of the Kinzhal missile, which relies on the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS. Lima operates by feeding the missiles with coordinates to aim at a different location other than the target. This technology has also enhanced the percentage of intercepting ballistic missiles to 30% in November from 15% in October. In this regard, the EW system plays a crucial role as a non-kinetic component of the missile defense system because it avoids consuming the precious few interceptors at a long distance away from the threat target. The analysis of this section illustrates that the US investment in the
7. New Anti-Drone
The Ukraine has commenced mass production of the Octopus, which is a drone interceptor drone that flies at night with varied altitudes and in the context of EW conditions. This is done in conjunction with other systems; these include the French multi-layer FPV defense swarms and the Sting interceptor drone with a 90% rate of efficiency concerning the destruction of UAVs Geran-2. This may be a remedy for the enhanced Shaheds offered by the Russians, including their ability to arm R-60 missiles to target Ukrainian aircraft. Having different options for anti-drone systems could better defend against saturation attacks.
8. Russia’s Continuous Missile Development
Analysis of debris from recent attacks has shown that Russia’s missiles come from production lines to enter into operation. Ihnat spoke about a recent missile that was built during the third quarter of this year and was used during a strike against Ternopil. It’s obvious that they produce missiles with industrial intensity despite the sanctions imposed on them; even components of these missiles trace back to Europe and the USA. Such a high degree of ability allows Russia to conduct high-intensity operations, making attrition strategies unnecessary and not affecting the line of production.
9. Strategic Need for Deep Precision Strike Capability
It has been argued that in order to destroy Russian infrastructure, airfields, and manufacturing facilities, Ukraine has a need to independently develop or purchase a deep precision strike capability. It is proposed that the FP-5 Flamingo and Long Neptune projects would materialize into effective homeland defense and attack capabilities; however, navigation and payload remain problems. Foreign entities’ Storm Shadow, SCALP EG, and ATACMS missiles have good navigation and payload capacity but low availability. The risk of a Ukrainian warehousing problem could soon materialize because new Deep Precision Strike technologies could bypass traditional concepts of defense operations and could reduce Ukrainian negotiating authority and give Russia a free rein to act as they see fit during aerial operations.
That night’s successful intercept operation not only showed incredible ability among F-16 pilots but is also a step closer to understanding that everything that is happening today is but temporary and short-lived as they lack missiles and miss understanding of Russia’s determination of tactics. As for those defending Ukraine, managing and holding a constant high-level trade for intercepts will remain a main challenge as development is still undergoing.
