What’s the difference between having the world’s best fighter jet and having enough to make it matter? For the U.S. Air Force, the answer is about 564 aircraft. The service planned for 750 F-22 Raptors, yet today only 186 exist, with fewer than 130 combat-coded. That gap isn’t just a procurement footnote-it’s a strategic vulnerability.
The story of the Raptor is a cautionary tale about changing priorities, budget politics, and missed opportunities. Born to dominate Soviet skies, it was sidestepped by the optimism of the post–Cold War era, the demands of counterinsurgency wars, and a belief that “good enough” would suffice. Now, with China and Russia fielding stealth fighters, the U.S. faces a high-end fight with a boutique fleet.
Following are nine pivotal factors decisions, constraints, and realities that explain how America ended up with too few of its most formidable air-superiority fighters and what that means for the future of air dominance.
1. From 750 to 186: The Procurement Collapse
The F-22 began as the crown jewel of the 1980s Advanced Tactical Fighter program, intended to replace the F-15C and guarantee air superiority against the Soviet Union’s MiG-29s and Su-27s. The Air Force’s original requirement-over 750 jets-was grounded in Cold War warfighting plans that envisioned massive Warsaw Pact air fleets. But after the Soviet collapse, successive budget cuts slashed the order: 648, then 442, then 339, and finally just 187 production aircraft. Each cut increased the per-unit cost, creating a classic “death spiral” that made the program politically vulnerable.
2. The post–Cold War ‘peace dividend’
The fall of the Berlin Wall triggered a strategic pivot. Without a peer adversary in view, Washington embraced the “peace dividend”, focused on savings over high-end capabilities. Critics asked why America needed an expensive stealth fighter when adversaries flew outdated third-generation jets. The F-15C’s perfect air-to-air record seemed to make the Raptor redundant. This short-term logic ignored the cyclical nature of great power competition a cycle now repeating with China and Russia.
3. Counterinsurgency’s Budgetary Grip
After 9/11, the Pentagon’s attention turned to Afghanistan and Iraq. As Robert Gates said, “The wars we were fighting at the time didn’t require air superiority fighters.” The funding began to flow to drones, MRAPs, and close air support, not stealth interceptors. The F-22, that $150-million thoroughbred, was relegated to secondary status as the services pressed into service platforms that could loiter over insurgent terrain. This reallocation of funds cemented the decision to cap production.
4. The F-35 as the ‘Good Enough’ Alternative
Others, including Gates, touted the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as a less expensive, multi-mission alternative. On paper, the F-35 was stealthy, had advanced sensors, and could be mass-produced. In reality, it couldn’t match the F-22’s thrust-vectoring agility, all-aspect stealth, or air dominance pedigree. Still, the F-35’s versatility made it politically easier to sell, and procurement momentum helped to justify ending the Raptor line.
5. Export Ban and Lost Economies of Scale
In the 1990s, Congress banned exports of the F-22 to protect sensitive technology. Allies such as Japan, Australia, and Israel were denied the chance to purchase it, which would have spread the cost and possibly sustained production longer. This decision has not only denied partners the world’s best air-superiority fighter but has also eliminated foreign orders that could have kept the line open longer, lowering unit costs and strengthening allied deterrence.
6. Restarting Production: The $50 Billion Mirage
A 2016 classified USAF study, later summarized publicly, estimated $9.8 billion in non-recurring costs and more than $40 billion for 194 new jets about $206–216 million each. Tooling was largely preserved but facilities had been repurposed, suppliers moved on, and key subsystems such as the AN/APG-77 radar and F119 engine would need to be redesigned. Even with foreign participation, timelines suggested first deliveries around 2030 far too late given NGAD’s trajectory.
7. Crisis of Readiness in a Boutique Fleet
The Air Force’s 2024 mission capable rate for the F-22 fell to just 40.19%, down from 57% two years earlier. Of 185 Raptors, only 143 are combat-coded, and fewer than 100 may be ready at any moment. High maintenance demands, stealth coating upkeep, and aging systems strain the small fleet, which needs to cover global commitments against rising Chinese and Russian stealth inventories.
8. The J-20 Challenge and Capability Edge
China’s Chengdu J-20 “Mighty Dragon” now numbers 270-300 aircraft, with long range and heavy payloads. Simulations-even by Chinese programmers-indicate that a lone J-20 has less than a 10 percent chance against an F-22, but numerical superiority and loyal wingman drones could help to tip the balance. The Raptor retains decisive advantages in stealth profile, internal missile load, and thrustvectoring agility, but its short range compared to the J-20’s 1,100-mile combat radius is a liability in Pacific scenarios.
9. Upgrades to Keep the Raptor
Relevant With NGAD years away, the Air Force is funding $90 million in FY26 for “viability” upgrades: an Infrared Defensive System for better missile detection, improved electronic warfare, stealth signature management, helmet-mounted displays, and podded IRST sensors. Stealthy drop tanks aim to extend range without compromising low observability. These measures are aimed at preserving the Raptor’s “first look, first shot, first kill” advantage into the 2030s. The F-22 Raptor remains unbeatable in air-to-air combat, but its rarity amounts to self-inflicted harm. From the post–Cold War complacency down to the export bans, strategic missteps exchanged long-term superiority for short-term savings. Now that peer adversaries are flying fifth-generation fighters by the dozens, America’s boutique air fleet will face a numbers game that no technology can overcome. The lesson, as mentioned, is clear: in air superiority, quality matters-but quantity still decides the fight.
